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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Truman appeals from his conviction and sentence for lewd conduct with a
minor under sixteen and sexual abuse of a minor following a jury trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Truman with lewd conduct
with a minor under sixteen and sexual abuse of a minor for acts committed
against his 12 year old stepdaughter, T.S. (R., pp. 17-19.) Truman entered a
plea of not guilty and the case was set for a jury trial. (R., pp. 28-29.)
At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Truman engaged in
various forms of sexual misconduct with T.S., his stepdaughter. The sexual
misconduct began when T.S. was 12 years old with Truman requesting that T.S.
videotape himself and J.R., a family friend, engaged in sexual conduct. (Trial Tr.,
p. 267, L. 10 - p. 271, L. 17.) T.S. testified that she first performed oral sex on
Truman later that evening. (Trial Tr., p. 272, Ls. 1-19.) She testified the abuse
escalated over time - that Truman engaged in oral sex with her more and more
frequently and that she would receive special favors when she complied with his
requests and that he would withhold privileges when she refused. (Trial Tr., p.
272, L. 20 - p. 278, L. 10.) The abuse stopped when T.S. reported it to members
of her church when she was 15 years old. (Trial Tr., p. 250, L. 10 - p. 252, L.
23.)

Following the presentation of evidence and closing arguments, the case
was submitted to the jury. The jury convicted Truman of both counts charged in
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the Information. (R, pp. 75-78; Trial Tr., p. 605, L. 13 - p. 606, L 10.) Truman
was sentenced to thirty years with twenty years fixed on the lewd conduct
charge. (R,. pp. 135-36, 141-42.) He was sentenced to fifteen years with ten
years fixed on the sexual abuse of a minor charge, to run concurrently.
Truman timely appealed. (R, pp. 137-40.)

I

.'

2

(Id.)

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Truman states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Was there insufficient evidence to support Mr. Truman's conviction
for sexual abuse of a minor?
2.
Did the district court lack jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
charge of sexual abuse of a minor because the facts alleged in the
indictment failed to allege a valid charge under the version of the statute
that applies to Mr. Truman's case?
3.
Did the district court err when it admitted prior bad acts evidence
against Mr. Truman?
4.
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when the prosecutor elicited
testimony in violation of the district court's order that deemed testimony
regarding J.R.'s mental condition inadmissible because it was irrelevant?
5.
Did the cumulative effect of the trial errors in this case deprive Mr.
Truman of his constitutional right to a fair trial?
(Appellant's brief, p. 11.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
The state concedes that the facts alleged in the indictment fail to support
the charge of sexual abuse of a minor and that Truman's sexual abuse-of a minor
conviction should be vacated.
2.
Has Truman failed to show that the district court erred when it admitted
prior bad acts evidence against Truman?
3.
Has Truman failed to show that the prosecutor committed misconduct
when it introduced testimony concerning J.R.'s mental condition?
4.
Has Truman failed to show error, let alone cumulative error, which would
warrant a new trial?
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The State Concedes That The Facts Alleged In The Indictment Fail To Support
The Charge Of Sexual Abuse Of A Minor And That Truman's Sexual Abuse Of A
Minor Conviction Should Be Vacated

A.

Introduction
Truman was charged with sexual abuse of a minor based on the fact that

he requested T.S. to videotape him engaging in sexual acts with J.R., a third
party.

Under the version of the statute in effect at that time, a solicitation

conviction under the statute required proof that the defendant communicated a
desire for the minor child to participate in the sexual act. Here, Truman did not
ask T.S. to participate in the act but rather to videotape the act. As a result, there
was insufficient evidence to support the charge and the charge was insufficient
as a matter of law.

B.

The Facts Alleged In The Indictment Fail To Support The Charge Of
Sexual Abuse Of A Minor And Truman's Sexual Abuse Of A Minor
Conviction Should Be Vacated
Truman was charged with sexual abuse of a minor, in violation of I.C. §

18-1506, based on the fact that he requested T.S. to videotape himself engaged
in a sexual act with J.R. at some point between August 2006 and December
2006. (R., p. 18.) At that time, the statute read, in relevant part:
(1)
It is a felony for any person eighteen (18) years or older, with
the intent to gratify the lust, passions or sexual desire of the actor,
minor child, or third party, to:
(a) solicit a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years
to participate in a sexual act...
(2) For purposes of this section "solicit" means any written, verbal,
or physical act which is intended to communicate to such minor
child the desire of the actor or third party to participate in a sexual
act or participate in sexual foreplay, by the means of sexual
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contact, photographing or observing such minor child engaged in
sexual contact.
I.C. § 18-1506.
Under this statutory scheme, a conviction for sexual abuse by solicitation
required proof that the defendant requested that the minor participate directly in
the sexual contact. 1 See Minturn v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 664, 168 P.3d 40, 48
(Ct. App. 2007). Thus, merely requesting a child to videotape or photograph
another engaged in sexual contact but not actually asking the child to participate
in the sexual act was insufficient to support the charge.

& For this reason, the

state concedes that the evidence presented at Truman's trial was insufficient to
support the sexual abuse of a minor charge.

Truman's conviction for sexual

abuse of a child should therefore be vacated.

II
Truman Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When
It Admitted Prior Bad Acts Evidence Against Him

A.

Introduction
Truman asserts that the district court abused its discretion when: it

admitted uncharged misconduct evidence, arguing the decision of the district
court was based upon an erroneous understanding of the law regarding I.R.E.
404(b) evidence standards in child sex cases.

(Appellant's brief, p. 19.) The

district court ruled, after hearing argument from both the state and the defense,
that "evidence of prior sexual contacts between Defendant and the victim and the

Idaho Code § 18-1506 has subsequently been amended to include Truman's
conduct. It now provides that it constitutes sexual abuse of a child to "induce,
cause or permit a minor child to witness an act of sexual conduct."
1

5

disclosure of dates as best as can be ascertained starting with the disclosure of
Defendant asking the victim about a sexual act and then the future acts of
solicitation between August and December, 2006, and further acts of sexual
contact during 2007, ending in December, 2007" was admissible. (R,. p. 71.)
Truman asserts that this ruling was error. However, Truman's argument
fails for several reasons. As an initial matter, Truman's assertion that the district
court necessarily abused its discretion because it failed to anticipate a chance in
the law is without merit.

In addition, Truman failed to adequately cite to the

transcript and it is unknown what evidence was purportedly admitted in
contravention of I.R.E. 404(b). Further, a careful review of the transcript of the
404(b) hearing shows that Truman acquiesced to the use of 404(b) evidence at
trial. Thus, Truman is precluded under the invited error doctrine from asserting
that the admission of the evidence was error. Even if Truman did not acquiesce
to the introduction of this evidence, this evidence was properly admitted to show
the res gestae of the crime and to show a common scheme or plan. Finally,
even if the admittance of this unknown evidence was error, such error was
harmless. For these reasons, Truman has failed to show that the district court
erred in admitting this evidence.

B.

Standard of Review
Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard:

whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is
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reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d
1185, 1187 (2009).

C.

Truman Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Admitting
Evidence Of Truman's Other Sexual Acts With T.S.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the

character of the defendant in an attempt to show he or she committed the crime
for which he or she is on trial. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185,
1188 (2009).

However, such evidence is admissible for other purposes,

including proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123
Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83,87,785 P.2d
647, 651 (Ct. App. 1989). Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if (a) it is
relevant to prove some issue other than the defendant's character, and (b) its
probative value for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by the
probability of unfair prejudice. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667,670,978 P.2d 227,
230 (1999). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence if the danger
of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State v. Sheahan,
139 Idaho 267,275-76,77 P.3d 956, 964-65 (2003).

1.

Truman's Argument That The District Court Necessarily Abused Its
Discretion Because It Failed To Anticipate A Change In The Law Is
Without Merit

Truman argues that because the district court failed to anticipate the
changes to the law as stated in State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49,205 P.3d 1185
(2009), its ruling was "predicated on an erroneous understanding of the law
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regarding I.R.E. 404(b) evidence standards in child sex cases," and therefore the
ruling was, as a matter of law, "fatally flawed from the outset" and erroneous.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 19-22.) Truman's argument that all pre-Grist evidentiary
rulings in child sex crime cases are ipso facto abuses of discretion is contrary to
applicable legal standards for appellate review.

,

The three elements of discretionary review are "whether: (1) the trial court
correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial court acted within the
outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal standards; and (3) the trial
court reached its decision through an exercise of reason." Grist, 147 Idaho at 51,
205 P.3d at 1187 (emphasis added) (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v.
Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991 )). The applicable
standard is thus not whether the court correctly articulated a certain legal
standard, but whether it acted consistently with those standards. Unlike argued
by Truman, the question here is whether the district court acted consistently with
applicable legal standards.
Likewise, Truman's argument fails because there is no reason to believe
that the district court misperceived the discretionary part of its inquiry. Grist did
not change the balancing test, the only discretionary part of the I.R.E. 404(b)
inquiry.

See Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188 ("This balancing is

committed to the discretion of the trial judge."). Grist changed the law on the
relevancy portion of the inquiry, Grist, 147 Idaho at 53-55, 205 P.3d at 1189-91, a
matter reviewed de novo. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225,230,178 P.3d 28, 33
(2008); State v. Williams, 134 Idaho 590, 592, 6 P.3d 840, 842 (Ct. App. 2000).
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Truman's claim that this Court should merely conclude that the district court erred
because the applicable case law has since modified the applicable legal standard
is unsupported by law.

2.

Truman's Claim Of Error Has Been Waived Because He Failed To
Cite To The Record

On appeal, Truman asserts that the "district court erred in admitting I.RE.
404(b) evidence against him because the district court's determination was
predicated on an erroneous understanding that there were relaxed standards of
admissibility for this evidence in cases where the defendant is charged with a
sexual offense against a minor." (Appellant's brief, p. 18.) Truman, however,
fails to cite to the transcript in support of his argument and, because there was
no objection at trial, it is unknown what evidence Truman deems improperly
admitted.

Truman's assertion of error in the admittance of "all of the State's

allegations of uncharged prior bad acts" (Appellant's brief, p. 19) is wholly
inadequate to satisfy the requirements of Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6). This
rule reads: "The argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with
respect to the issues on appeal, the reasons therefore, with citations to the
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon."
(emphasis added). See also, State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 20, 966 P.2d 1,20
(1998); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). Because
it is unknown what evidence Truman considers improperly admitted I.R.E. 404(b)
evidence, the state is unable to adequately respond to this assertion. As a result,
the issue should not be considered on appeal.
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3.

If This Court Deems That Truman Has Not Waived This Issue,
Truman Is Precluded By The Doctrine Of Invited Error From
Asserting That The District Court Erred In Admitting Uncharged
Misconduct Evidence When He Agreed To Admission Of The
Evidence

The doctrine of invited error estops a party from asserting an error when
his own conduct induced the commission of the error. State v. Atkinson, 124
Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993). A party may not complain of
errors he has consented to or acquiesced in. State v. Caudhill, 109 Idaho 222,
226,706 P.2d 456,460 (1985).
Under the doctrine of invited error, Truman is precluded from claiming that
the district court improperly admitted I.R.E. 404(b) evidence against him. The
state believes that Truman is objecting to uncharged misconduct evidence that
was included in a CARES report that was discussed at a pre-trial hearing. (See
generally 9/8/08 Tr., p. 14, L. 4 - p. 52, L. 15.) Although Truman neglects to
mention it in his brief, at the pre-trial hearing Truman's attorney specifically
agreed to the admission of this uncharged misconduct evidence and, as a result,
under the doctrine of invited error, the evidence was properly admitted.
Specifically, at the 404(b) hearing Truman's attomey stated:
Just real brief. Judge, I have no problem if this lady
wants to come in here and say I had this incident started when
I was 11 years old, number one, when I was 11 years old. And
that was in 2004, according to my calculation. I might be off a year
or two. Maybe a year. It happened in 2004. And this is what Mr.
Truman did to me. He came to my room and did this.
Then three or four years later, in 2007, when I was 14 years
old, then this is what happened. This is what he did. Then she
can give us the laundry list of what Mr. Truman supposedly
did. If that's what we have, that's fine.
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(9/8/08 Tr., p. 19, L. 17 - p. 20, L. 4 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor then

explained that he couldn't pin the victim to specific dates but that the victim could
give her age and approximates dates or times of the year. (9/8/08 Tr., p. 20, Ls.
23 - p. 22, L. 7.) Truman's attorney agreed:

Judge, I do agree with that. And just for the state's
benefit, I'm not talking about this lady has to remember the
month, the day. All I'm saying is she said when I was 11 years
old, which was, according to my calculation 2004, some incident
. happened. Then nothing transpired after that until 2007.
I'm not asking that she come in here and recall
specifically the month and the day. All I'm saying is that's three
years' gap in between. If that is. the case, I'm fine with that. 80 as
opposed to saying, well, we have one incident in 2004 when I was
11 years old. Oh, by the way, another incident happened six
months later in maybe 2005. Then maybe three more incidents
happened in 2006, or five more incidents happened in 2006. That's
what I'm trying to guard against
I agree with the state. I'm not asking that she give me a
particular day, a particular month. All I'm saying is we have
two instances. One in 2004 when she was 11. There may be a
series of offenses in 2007; I will go as far as saying that.
r.1aybe that's the allegation. And I'm not asking that she give
me specific days and months regarding that. I just wanted
recognition regarding the time frame in between the first approach
and the allegation in this case. That's what I'm asking.
(9/8/08 Tr., p. 22, L. 8 - p. 23, L. 11 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor and

court discussed the time-frame to which T.8. would testify, which included sexual
contact during the "six months or eight months" prior to December 7, 2007
(8/9/08 Tr., p. 23, L. 14 - p. 26, L. 22), and the following colloquy ensued:

The Court:

Okay, 80 what you just presented to me, you - are
you objecting to any portion of what he just said, Mr.
Omanubosi, as far as evidence?

Mr. Onanubosi: What the state or-
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The Court:

Yea, the state just said. He just described sort of the
time frame as to what she's going to testify - they're
requesting her to testify to previous events.

Mr.Onanubosi:
Okay. As it relates to count-one, which is the
th
5 day of December, 2007, as to - I'm talking about
the indictment itself.
The Court:

Yeah.

Mr. Onanubosi:
That these particular acts took place. I'm
not going to take object to that. Of course she
can testify to that. So that was December - that
was December, 2007.
As it relates to a series of events that
supposedly took place between August 2006 and
December 2006, the allegation says that those are
the time that my client supposedly solicited the older
girl to engage in videotaping of a sexual act between
himself and the stepdaughter.

I
.

I

If this lady is going to come and say, well,
during those months, between December 2006
and - August 2006 and December 2006, a series
of solicitations took place, I think she can testify
to that. I think she can testify to that.

I

(9/8/08 Tr., p. 26, L. 23 - p. 27, L. 25 (emphasis added).)

Based on the

foregOing, it is apparent that Truman's attomey specifically approved of T.S.
giving a "laundry list" of what happened in the last six to eight months of 2007
and further agreed to T.S. explaining a series of events in 2006.
At trial, T.S. testified consistently with what the parties discussed at the
September 8, 2008 hearing.

T.S. testified about the first time that Truman

approached her when she was 12 years old. (Trial Tr., p. 266, L. 12 - p. 267, L.
9.) She explained that he came into her bedroom and told her that if she was
ever curious about anything or ever wanted to try anything that he was there to
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help. (Trial Tr., p. 267, Ls. 2-7.) She explained that "he's basically there for me
to experiment with."

(Trial Tr., p. 267, L. 7.)

Truman previously agreed to

admission of this testimony. (See 9/S/0S Tr., p. 19, L. 16-20; p. 20, Ls. 15-20.)
T.S. also testified about the time that Truman asked her to videotape
himself and J.R. having oral sex. (Trial Tr., p. 267, L. 10 - p. 271, L. 15.) Again,
as this testimony addresses Count II of the Information, it is squarely within the
scope of admissible testimony.

Truman also affirmatively agreed to this

testimony as one of a "series of solicitations" that took place between August
2006 and December 2006. (See 9/S/0S Tr., p. 27, Ls. 21-25.)
T.S. explained how the evening after the videotape incident, Truman
approached her and J.R. in her bedroom and that she performed oral sex on
Truman for the first time that evening. (Trial Tr., p. 271, L. is - p. 272, L. 19.)
She also explained that this only occurred occasionally in the beginning but
became more and more frequent over time. (Trial Tr., p. 272, L. 20 - p. 273, L.

is.) Again, Truman previously agreed to this testimony. (See 9/S/0S Tr., p. 22 ,
L. S - p. 23, L. 11; p. 26, L. 23 - p. 27, L. 25.)
She further testified about an incident that occurred when she and Truman
were four-wheeling in the mountains (Trial Tr., p. 274, L. 19 - 276, L. 24), and
about how she would receive special favors from Truman when she acquiesced
to his demands, and how he would withhold privileges when she refused to
participate (Trial Tr., p. 276, L. 25 - p. 27S, L. 10). This testimony also falls
within Truman's agreement that T.S. could testify about the "laundry list of what
Mr. Truman supposedly did." (See 9/S/0S Tr., p. 20, Ls. 2-4.)
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Finally, T.S. testified that Truman had also touched her "breasts and butt,"
that her mind would detach and she wouldn't think about what she was doing
while she was performing oral sex on Truman, and that he had used a vibrator
and sex creams with her. (Trial Tr., p. 281, L. 16 - p. 285, L. 25.) Again, this
testimony falls within the "laundry list" of testimony to which Truman previously
agreed.
Under the doctrine of invited error, Truman cannot now complain about
the admission of evidence to which he previously acquiesced.

Although it is

unknown what specific evidence Truman .objects to, the entirety of T.S.'s
testimony fell within the range of evidence to which he had previously agreed.
The doctrine of invited error precludes Truman from raising this issue on appeal.

4.

To The Extent That Truman Did Not Invite The Admission Of The
404(b) Evidence, Such Evidence Was Properly Admitted By The
District Court As The Res Gestae Of The Crime And To Show A
Common Scheme Or Plan

To the extent that Truman did not invite the admission of the 404(b)
evidence, such evidence falls squarely within the pUNiew of 404(b) and the
district court correctly admitted it. Truman, relying primarily on State v. Grist, 147
Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 (2009), asserts that this evidence was relevant only to
show propensity. A closer review of Grist, however, shows that it does not forbid
the admission of the prior acts committed against T.S.
The Court in Grist discussed admission of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) to
corroborate a victim and to show a common scheme or plan. It did not state that
evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible for this purpose, but emphasized that if
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the only relevance of the evidence was that it tended to show that because the
defendant did it before he probably did it again it was not properly considered
evidence of either corroboration or a common scheme or plan. Grist, 147 Idaho
at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190 ("The unstated premise in Moore is simply this: 'If he did
it before, he probably did it this time as well.' This complete reliance upon
propensity is not a permissible basis for the admission of evidence of uncharged
misconduct.") The Court went on, however, to point out that prior bad act
evidence can be admissible to corroborate or show a common plan or scheme.
Id. at 54-55, 205 P.3d at 1190-91. The Court cautioned that district courts
should scrutinize whether evidence offered to show corroboration or common
scheme or plan "actually serves the articulated purpose or whether such
evidence is merely propensity evidence served up under a different name." .!Q, at
55,205 P.3d at 1191.
Here the evidence is admissible for purposes other than mere propensity.
Truman's prior sexual acts with T.S. were relevant and admissible because they
tended to show the res gestae of the crime and his intent, preparation, and plan
to engage in inappropriate sexual activity with T.S.

State v. Blackstead, 126

Idaho 14,878 P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1994), is instructive on this point.
In Blackstead, the defendant hired RS., the fifteen-year-old daughter of a
family friend, to help him paint. 126 Idaho at 16, 878 P.2d at 190. At some point
when RS. was at Blackstead's house, he offered her marijuana, which she
accepted, gave her "peanut butter crank," and, while RS. was under the
influence of these drugs, Blackstead had intercourse with her. Id. Afterwards,
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Blackstead drove R.S. home and "gave her forty dollars and a bag of marijuana."

.!Q., "[S]everal days after this first sexual encounter, Blackstead arrived at R.S.'s"
and "allegedly provided drugs, including crank, which he and [R.S.] used." .!Q.,
Blackstead then asked R.S. "if she could 'slip away for awhile.'"

.!Q., R.S.

declined and Blackstead left. .!Q.,
On appeal, Blackstead argued that the district court erred in admitting
evidence of the drug use, claiming such evidence was improper under I.R.E.
404(b). Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 17-19, 878 P.2d at 191-193. The Court of
Appeals found the first incident of drug use admissible as part of the res gestae
of the alleged sexual offense . .!Q., at 18-, 878 P.2d at 192. The court explained,
"In this context, res gestae refers to other acts that occur during the commission
of or in close temporal proximity to the charged offense which must be described
to complete the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the context of nearby
and nearly contemporaneous happenings."

.!Q., (intemal quotes omitted).

It

continued:
The state is entitled to present a full and accurate account of
the circumstances of the commission of the crime, and if such an
account also implicates the defendant or defendants in the
commission of other crimes for which they have not been charged,
the evidence is nevertheless admissible. The jury is entitled to
base its decision upon a full and accurate description of the events
conceming the whole criminal act, regardless of whether such
description also implicates a defendant in other criminal acts .

.!Q., (citing State v. Izatt, 96 Idaho 667, 670, 534 P.2d 1107, 1110 (1975)). The
court concluded that "disclosure of the drug use was necessary ... to give the
jury a full explanation of how the sexual contact came about." .!Q.,
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With respect to the second incident, the Court of Appeals concluded that
although it was not part of the res gestae of the first sexual offense or an offense
that was alleged to have occurred three to four weeks later, such evidence was
relevant and admissible. Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 19, 878 P.2d at 193. The
Court explained:
[T]he district court also stated that this evidence .was relevant to
Blackstead's process of grooming R.S. for sexual exploitation. This
presents an independent rationale for relevance which we must
examine. From the record it is apparent that the state sought to
show that Blackstead used drugs as a method of seducing or
lowering the resistance of the victim and rewarding her for
submission to his sexual demands. It must be remembered that
although Blackstead was convicted for only the first alleged offense
... , the state had charged and at trial presented evidence of a
second molestation several weeks later. That occasion when
Blackstead allegedly gave drugs to RS. and E.M. and asked RS.
to "slip away" preceded the second charged sexual offense. We
conclude that evidence of this intervening meeting and drug use
with RS. and E.M. was probative of a continuing criminal design by
Blackstead to cultivate a relationship with RS., induce her
submission to his sexual demands and procure her silence through
use of drugs - a process which the district court referred to as
"grooming."

The Court further noted that "[p]roof of a plan to commit the charged crime
is a purpose authorized by !.RE. 404(b) for introduction of other crimes
evidence," and, as such, "in cases where uncharged criminal acts of the
de(endant were in furtherance of an underlying plan to commit the charged
crime, those acts are, ... admissible to show the accomplishment of the criminal
goal."

kL

see also State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 255, 899 P.2d 959, 965 (Ct.

App. 1995) (concluding evidence of defendant's statements regarding his
"interest" in minor victim, "whether viewed as evidence of uncharged misconduct
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or not, were highly probative" because "[t]hey were evidence of Tapia's scheme
or plan to subject a particular eleven year old girl to sexual acts ... , [and] [t]hey
showed the preparations undertaken by Tapia to put his plan into action and his
intent to gratify his sexual desire for this adolescent girl").
Like in Blackstead, Truman's prior sexual acts with T.S. are evidence of
the res gestae of the crime and "present a full and accurate account of the
circumstances of the commission of the crime." Testimony concerning Truman's
prior sexual acts with T.S. are inseparably connected to the chain of events
leading to the current charges against Truman. This testimony was necessary to
explain how Truman's conduct against T.S. developed over time and how T.S.
finally decided to report the charged incident.
Further, Truman's attempts to engage T.S. in sexual discussions and
conduct with him are evidence of grooming T.S. for sexual exploitation.
Truman's conversations with T.S., his solicitations of T.S., and his rewarding T.S.
for acquiescing to his demands show Truman's intent to lower her resistance to
his sexual demands. This evidence was clearly relevant to show Truman's plan,
intent, and motive.
The relevance of evidence of prior bad acts is given free review. Johnson,
2010 WL 337993, *2. All of the evidence of prior incidents are relevant to the res
gestae of the crime and to Truman's plan, sexual intent, and motive. As such,

the evidence is relevant and admissible. Further, while the evidence may also be
prejudicial, it is not unfairly so. Truman has failed to establish the district court
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abused its discretion in concluding its probative value was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
D.

Truman Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Admitting
Evidence Of Truman's Sexual Acts With J.R.
Truman asserts that the admission of uncharged evidence regarding

allegations of sexual contact between himself and J.R. was error because those
acts were only relevant to an invalid charge.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 22-23.)

However, despite his ability to do so, Truman failed to object to the charge of
sexual abuse of a minor at trial and failed to object to evidence supporting that
charge at trial. It is well settled that the failure to raise an issue before the trial
court generally waives that issue for purposes of appeal. State v. McAway, 127
Idaho 54, 60,896 P.2d 962, 968 (1995); State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842,844,828
P.2d 871, 873 (1992); State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641,645-46,22 P.3d 116, 12021 (Ct. App. 2001). Although an exception to this bedrock principle of appellate

revievv exists if the alleged error constitutes fundamental error, Truman cannot
successfully argue the existence of fundamental error in this case. As held by
the Idaho Supreme Court, the allegedly erroneous admission of I.R.E. 404(b)
evidence "is a trial error and does not go to the foundation of the case or take
from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense." State v.
Cannady, 137 Idaho 67,72-73,44 P.3d 1122, 1127-28 (2002) (citing McAway,
127 Idaho 54, 896 P.2d 962); State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 894 P.2d 125
(1995); State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424 (1989)). The admission
of such evidence does not constitute fundamental error which can be reviewed
on appeal even though no objection was made below. J.9.,. Thus, Truman's claim
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of error is not appropriate for appellate review, and this court must decline to
consider it.
Further, even assuming that this court considers Truman's assertion of
error! the uncharged misconduct was relevant to and the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the acts as corroborative evidence of the lewd
conduct charge. On direct examination, after several introductory questions to
establish J.R.'s ability to tell the truth from a lie, her familiarity with Truman and
his family, the layout of Truman's house, and J.R.'s euphemisms for various body
parts (Trial Tr., p. 199, L. 11 - p. 205, L. 21), the entire extent of J.R.'s testimony
on direct examination about the facts of this case consisted of the following:
Q.

[J.R.], have you ever seen Jeff's thing?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was there ever a time when you and rr.S.] and Jeff were together
that you saw his thing?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was there anything - do you remember if the TV was on one of
those times where the TV had something on it?

A.

Sometimes.

Q.

And what kind of things would be on that?

A.

People naked

Q.

Okay. And during any of those times when you saw Jeff's thing
was there anything that you and [T.S.] and Jeff did during that
time?

A.

I don't understand.

Q.

Okay. Did you ever touch Jeff's thing?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

Was [T.S.] there when that happened?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did Jeff's thing - would anything - did you put Jeffs thing
anywhere in your body or on your body?

A.

In my mouth and on my chest.

Q.

Okay. And you say our -

A.

Mine and [T.S]'s.

Q.

Yours and [T.S]'s, okay.

(Trial Tr., p. 205, L. 21 - p. 206, L. 22.)
As an initial matter, this testimony was clearly relevant to both charges
against Truman. This evidence is clearly admissible in the sexual abuse charge,
and an acquittal on appeal does not retroactively make its admission erroneous.
See,~, Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 19, 878 P.2d at 193 (acquittal did not change

analysis of admissibility). Likewise, for admission on the lewd conduct charge,
the district court must determine "whether the fact of another crime or wrong, if
established, would be relevant.

Evidence of uncharged misconduct must be

relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other
than propensity." Grist, 147 Idaho at 52,205 P.3d at 1188 (internal quotes and
citations omitted). Here, J.R.'s testimony was relevant to a material and disputed
issue on the lewd conduct count: whether or not T.S. fabricated her allegations
of abuse. Throughout the pre-trial proceedings and trial, Truman consistently
insinuated that T.S. was lying and that she fabricated the allegations, placing
T.S.'s credibility squarely at issue. (See, generally. Trial Tr., p. 188, L. 6 - p.
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189, L. 7; p. 223, L. 16 - p. 224, L. 7; p. 313, L. 15 - p. 314, L. 15; p. 317, L. 24p. 321, L. 21; p. 555, L. 24 - p. 589, L. 9.) Thus, J.R's testimony was directly
relevant to support and corroborate the lewd conduct charge by Truman against
T.S.
The word "corroborate" was defined in Grist as:
To strengthen; to add weight or credibility to a thing by additional
and confirming facts or evidence. The testimony of a witness is
said to be corroborated when it is shown to correspond with the
representation of some other witnesses, or to comport with some
facts otherwise known or established.
BLACKS LAW
DICTIONARY, 311 (5th ed. 1979).
Grist, 147 Idaho at 54,205 P.3d at 1190. Here, J.R's testimony corroborates
T.S.'s testimony.

J.R only testified about instances of sexual conduct that

occurred with Truman when T.S. was present. Given Truman's defense that J.R.
was fabricating the allegations against him, J.R.'s testimony adds "weight or
credibility" to T.S.'s testimony "by additional and confirming facts or evidence."
After determining that the 404(b) evidence is relevant, the court must
engage in a balancing under I.RE. 403 and determine whether the danger of
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.
Grist, 147 Idaho at 52,205 P.3d at 1188. Here, J.R.'s testimony was not unduly
prejudicial. Her testimony was brief. It corroborated T.S.'s testimony and only
addressed those situations when T.S. was also present. Thus, this testimony
was properly admitted. Truman has failed to show that the district court abused
its discretion in admitting this evidence.
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E.

The Admission Of The !.R.E. 404(b) Evidence Against Truman Was
Harmless
Finally, even if the district court erred in permitting the introduction of

unidentified !.R.E. 404(b) evidence, such error is harmless. "The inquiry is
whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the
defendant] even without the admission of the challenged evidence."

State v.

Johnson, 2010 WL 337993, *4. Again, it is important to note that Truman has
failed to identify what evidence should have been excluded at trial, thus making it
more difficult make this determination. While Truman correctly concludes that
the credibility of the victim was important to the verdict, he fails to articulate how
the evidence in question would have affected the jury's assessment of that
credibility. Indeed, if the jury found the victim credible there was little to no risk
that it convicted Truman merely because he was a man of criminal character.
Because the evidence in question came primarily or exclusively from the same
witness, the victim, there was no actual risk that the juri concluded the victim
was credible merely because Truman was of the character to have done what
the victim testified he did.
This situation stands in contrast to State v. Johnson, 2010 WL 337993. In
Johnson, the case also hinged on the credibility of the victim. Johnson, 2010 WL
337993, *4. However, in Johnson the 404(b) evidence consisted of a separate
victim testifying about events that occurred many years earlier.

lli In concluding

that the admission of this evidence was not harmless, the court held, "Evidence
of prior sexual misconduct with young children is so prejudicial that there is a
reasonable possibility this error contributed to Johnson's conviction."
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lli

Here,

the case also hinged on T.S.'s credibility. However, all of the evidence of prior
sexual misconduct admitted at trial was misconduct that involved T.S. and to
which T.S. testified.

Either the jury believed her testimony at trial or it didn't.

There was no testimony concerning prior sexual misconduct with other children.
Further, the testimony of J.R. only included those incidents that occurred while
T. S. was present . . For these reasons, even if the district court erred in admission

of the unknown 404(b) evidence, such admission was harmless.

III
Truman Has Failed To Show That The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When
The Prosecutor Elicited Testimony Concerning J.R.'s Mental Condition

A.

Introduction
Truman asserts that the prosecutor erred when he deliberately elicited

testimony concerning J.R.'s competency and mental condition in contravention of
the court's order. (Appellant's brief, p. 26.) However, a close review of the order
and transcript shows that the prosecutor did not elicit testimony in contravention
of the court's order. Further, even if the testimony was error, Truman has failed
to show that the error rose to the level of fundamental error.

B.

Standard of Review
"A conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only when the

conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error." State v. Porter,
130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997); see also State v. MacDonald,
131 Idaho 367, 956 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1998). Such error is fundamental only if
the alleged misconduct is so egregious or inflammatory that any prejudice arising
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therefrom was not, or could not have been, remedied by a ruling from the trial
court informing the jury that it should be disregarded. Porter, 130 Idaho at 78586, 948 P.2d at 140-41; State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d 916
(1990); State v. Missamore, 114 Idaho 879, 761 P.2d 1231 (Ct. App. 1988); State
v. Ames, 109 Idaho 373,707 P.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1985).

C.

Truman Has Failed To Show That The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct
In His Direct Examination Of Ms. LaFranier
Prosecutorial misconduct was discussed in State v. Barnes, 147 Idaho

587,597,212 P.3d 1017, 1027 (Ct. App. 2009) (internal citations omitted):
When there is no contemporaneous objection, a conviction will be
reversed for prosecutorial misconduct only if the conduct is
sufficiently egregious so as to result in fundamental error.
Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error
when it is calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse
prejudice or passion against the defendant, or is so inflammatory
that the jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors
outside the evidence.
However, even when prosecutorial
misconduct has resulted in fundamental error, the conviction will
not be reversed when that error is harmless. The test for whether
prosecutorial misconduct constituted harmless error is whether the
appellate court can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
result of the trial would not have been different absent the
misconduct.
When a defendant does not object at trial, the inquiry is three-tiered.

!ih First,

the appellate court must determine factually if there was prosecutorial
misconduct.

!ih If there was, then the court must determine whether the

misconduct rose to the level of fundamental error.

!ih Finally, if error was

fundamental error, the appellate court must consider whether the misconduct
prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial or whether it was harmless.

25

!ih

•

Truman asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he
elicited testimony regarding J.R.'s mental condition in alleged contravention of
the court's order.

(Appellant's brief, p. 27.) Truman concedes, however, that

there was no contemporaneous objection at trial to the testimony. (Id.)
Prior to trial, Truman's attorney filed a motion in limine requesting that the
state be prevented from eliciting testimony regarding J.R.'s mental capacity
and/or mental condition during the trial (R., p. 61), which was granted (R., p. 71).
It is apparent, however, from the pre-trial discussions and from the district court's
order, discussed infra, that the district court was simply prohibiting the state from
discussing J.R.'s actual mental disability or her diagnoses, as that would only be
relevant if Truman was charged with a crime against J.R. based upon whether or
not she could legally consent to the sexual contact between herself and Truman,
and not whether J.R. was developmentally delayed.
At a pre-trial hearing, Truman's attorney explained the issue to the court:

"

just don't want to be in the situation where somebody's talking about

medical testimony, whether or not she's able - I mean, they can talk about her
disability, what she suffers from and things like that, but I just don't want to get
into whether or not she - what age does she operate." (9/2/08 Tr., p. 7, L. 23-

p. 8, L. 4.)
Six days later, at a motions hearing, the following colloquy conceming the
motion in limine occurred:
[THE PROSECUTOR]:
The issue Mr. Onanubosi wants to get to
or seems to be getting at is we can't address that [J.R.] unless we
have a specific witness testify the foundation that she's mentally
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handicapped, because it's rape to have sex with a person who is
mentally deficient, when you know they're mentally deficient.
However, [J.R.]'s testimony in this case has nothing to do with a
charge against him. It has to do with the acts that she was
performing while [T.S.] was there watching and the videotaping.
And the defendant admits to having intercourse with her, which
puts [T.S.]- or could put her in the room at the time. That's where
this is going.
THE COURT:
We haven't gotten to that issue about her
developmental capacity yet. But how are you going to establish
that in the trial?
[THE PROSECUTOR]:
all.
THE COURT:

Actually, I don't intend to establish it at

So you don't plan to have any testimony on it?

[THE PROSECUTOR]:
The most I would have is a witness,
another witness who she was THE COURT:

Is [J.R.] going to testify?

[THE PROSECUTOR]:
Yes. [J.R.] is going to testify and her
competency is the same as any other witness on the stand, is
whether or not she understands the difference between the truth
and a lie, which is usually presumed for an adult. Children we all
ask that little series of questions, do you know the difference and
things like that.
And two is her ability to perceive and recall the events. I'm going to
get - grant you that there may take a little more prompting of
questions, things like that, and that's something we'll have to see
how she's doing on the stand.
But that's her competency as a witness, not her competency to
consent to sex, which isn't an issue in this case at all. The only
thing I can think of is she used to live in a state school. She now
lives with - and to calm her down we talk about where she lives
and who she lives with, and it's pretty clear that she has some
mental deficiencies. But she did go to Nampa High School to '88 to
'92. She knows her age. She knows who she lived with, things like
that, to kind of establish those issues.
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The most I would probably do is she's bad with dates. The person
who is her guardian that she lives with would come in to testify
about - that for a period while she was in college, she would drop
[JR.] off to be babysat at the defendant's house, and that was from
August to December of 2006, which then puts this solicitation crime
into that time frame.
THE COURT:
Okay.
So what is your response to Mr.
Onanubosi's motion in limine regarding - eliciting testimony
regarding [J.R.]'s mental capacity or mental condition?
[THE PROSECUTOR]:
Other that what I've just told you, I think
that it. There's no need to qualify an expert or to have an expert
come in and say that she's got the mind of a 7-to-12-year-old,
again, because her competency in this case isn't an issue with a
crime. Her competency is ability to remember or recall events and
to discern the truth.
(9/8/08 Tr., p. 42, L. 9 - p. 45, L. 1.)

After further diSCUssion, the district court ruled:
[T]he state is not - pursuant to Mr. Onanubosi's motion, the
state is - and the state's own acknowledgment, the state is not
going to be allowed to attempt to establish the developmental
disability of [JR.] in the testimony of the case.
And I guess the - my point would be before that comes out
in any way, if you determine that for some reason it's inescapable,
based on the testimony, you should do an offer outside the
presence of the jury. If it just can't be addressed, you need to
make an offer before the judge, who's balancing the 403 factors in
this case.
But my understanding is you don't intent to ask any
questions about that. I think your point is it will be obvious to
people that (9/8/08 Tr., p. 50, L. 14 - p. 51, L. 5.)

Mr. Bazzoli responded, "It will be. It will be a little difficult, because it's like
talking to a child .... " (9/8/08 Tr., p. 51, Ls. 6-8.)
Finally, the written order stated:
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As to the mental capacity of [J.R.], her mental status is not a
relevant factor'to the charges in this case as Defendant is not
charged with any crime at this time for the sexual contact with
[J.R.]. [J.R.]'s testimony is subject to her competency to testify as a
witness not upon her mental status as it may relate to other
possible charges.
(R., p. 71.)
Based on the entirety of the foregoing, it is apparent that the district court
was simply prohibiting the state from discussing J.R.'s actual mental disability or
her diagnoses to the extent those only would be relevant to whether she could
legally consent to the sexual contact between herself and Truman.

Because

Truman was not charged with a crime against J.R., a discussion of her
competency to consent would not be relevant.
Truman now contends that the testimony of Ms. LaFranier, J.R.'s
guardian, was in contravention of the court's order.

(Appellant's brief, p. 29.)

Ms. LaFranier testified as follows:
Q.

Liz, what do you do for a living?

A.

I work at the Nampa School District with Special Ed students.

Q.

How long have you done that?

A.

Eleven years.

Q.

Do you know someone by the name of [J.R.]?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

How long have you known [J.R.]?

A.

[J.R.] was in my classroom for two years, and she's lived with us for
seven, so nine years.

Q.

How old is [J.R.]?
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questions did not discuss J.R.'s actual mental disability or diagnoses, nor did the
prosecutor attempt to do so.

The district court's order simply precluded a

discussion of J.R.'s mental status as it may have related to any potential crime
committed by Truman against J.R. (See, R., p. 71.) The district court, however,
did not exclude testimony concerning J.R.'s ability to testify as a witness. (Id.)
Here, the prosecutor permissibly questioned J.R.'s guardian in order to establish
foundation for the guardian's testimony.
Further, even if the prosecutor elicited testimony from Ms. LaFranier in
contravention of the court's order, such testimony did not rise to the level of
fundamental error. Misconduct by a prosecutor is fundamental only if the alleged
misconduct is so egregious or inflammatory that any prejudice arising from it was
not, or could not have been, remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing
the jury that it should be disregarded. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785-786,
948 P.2d 127, 140-141 (1997); State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d
916,923 (1990); State v. Missamore, 114 Idaho 879, 761 P.2d 1231 (Ct. App.
1988); State v. Ames, 109 Idaho 373, 707 P.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1985).
First, because the state's questioning of Ms. LaFranier concerning her
relationship with J.R. was outside the purview of the district court's order it was
not error, let alone fundamental error. Apparently neither the district court nor
Truman's trial counsel, both aware of the court's order, considered the
questioning improper.

Second, even if objectionable, the line of questioning

could have been cured by a timely objection and, therefore, any error is not
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fundamental. As Truman concedes, he did not object to this line of questioning.
(Appellant's brief, p. 27.)
"An error is harmless if the appellate court is able to say, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the jury would. have reached the same result absent the
error." State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575,578,114 P.3d 133, 136 (Ct. App. 2005)
(citing State v. Boman, 123 Idaho 947,950-51,854 P.2d 290, 293-94 (Ct. App.
1993)). In light of the evidence presented, even if this Court finds error, any error
was harmless. J.R.'s mental disability was readily observable to everyone in the
courtroom. (See generally, Trial Tr., p. 199, L. 11 - p. 214, L. 12, p. 235, L. 6p. 244, L. 16.) Although J.R. was 26, both the prosecutor and defense had to
question her as if she were a much younger child.

(ld.)

J.R.'s guardian's

testimony simply gave context to and explained why J.R. was present in
Truman's home. This Court can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
jury would have reached the same result absent any error. Because Truman has
failed to establish the prosecutor's questions were improper, or that even if
improper he was prejudiced by the arguments,he is not entitled to relief.

IV
Truman Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To This
Case
Under the doctrine of cumUlative error, a series of errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v.
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453,872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate
to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v.
Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Truman has failed to
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show that two or more errors occurred in his trial, and therefore the doctrine is
inapplicable to this case. See, M.,., LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 121,937
P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in the trial had been shown, they
would not amount to a denial of due process that would require reversal. State v.
Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella,
135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of errors
deemed harmless).
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully concedes that Truman's conviction for sexual abuse
of a minor be vacated. The state respectfully requests, however, that Truman's
conviction for lewd conduct be affirmed.
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